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Abstract. Railway turnouts are fundamental mechanical infrastructures, which allow a rolling 
stock to divert one direction to another. As those are of a large number of engineering sub-
systems, e.g. track, signalling, earthworks, these particular sub-systems are expected to induce 
high potential through various kind of failure mechanisms. This could be a cause of any 
catastrophic event. A derailment, one of undesirable events in railway operation, often results, 
albeit rare occurs, in damaging to rolling stock, railway infrastructure and disrupt service, and 
has the potential to cause casualties and even loss of lives. As a result, it is quite significant 
that a well-designed risk analysis is performed to create awareness of hazards and to identify 
what parts of the systems may be at risk. This study will focus on all types of environment 
based failures as a result of numerous contributing factors noted officially as accident reports. 
This risk analysis is designed to help industry to minimise the occurrence of accidents at 
railway turnouts. The methodology of the study relies on accurate assessment of derailment 
likelihood, and is based on statistical multiple factors-integrated accident rate analysis. The 
study is prepared in the way of establishing product risks and faults, and showing the impact of 
potential process by Boolean algebra. 
1.  Introduction 
Derailment is an undesirable phenomenon causing damage to rolling stock and infrastructure as well 
as service disruptions, and which might also cause casualties and harm the environment. Moreover, 
these effects might result in serious reputation and financial losses to railway companies and 
organisations, as well as social, mental and economic consequences to the public. Although EU 
members have claimed that train operating safety is constantly improving and the number of 
derailments across the EU has been slightly improved, there appear to have been around 500 
derailments per year in the last ten years, of which 7% (35 derailments) involved catastrophic 
consequences [1]. On average, catastrophic derailments potentially result in 30 fatalities per year, each 
of which costs, on average, 10M£ [2].  
  
 
 
 
 
As for the situation in the UK, Network Rail has 21,000 track miles and 19,000 turnouts [3]. In other 
words, it can be said that there is one turnout per 1,14 track mile. As a result, a large number of 
derailments, accounting for 46% potentially higher-risk train accidents over the last 10 years, has 
occurred at British turnouts [4]. Causes of a derailment are often truck and turnout component failures, 
malicious operational failures, loading faults, environmental conditions, human factors, interaction 
problems or a combination of them [5]. 
2.  Literature Review and Related Studies 
 
The purpose of Fault tree analysis (FTA) lies in revealing a single system failure mode and qualitative 
information on how a relevant event may occur and what consequences this event can cause [6]. Many 
studies on various aspects of railway safety are formed of FTA-including methodologies. Pei et al. [7] 
proposed a fault tree analysis method combined with quantitative analysis to investigate high-speed 
railway accidents. Li et al. [8] discussed the train crash accident from a broader viewpoint, and 
analysed the train crash accident related safety issues through the fault tree model of the train rear-end. 
Leveson [9] used FTA to reach a detailed diagram of the contributing causes of accidents. Yao [10] 
introduced an improved intelligent system for railway safety-focused risk analysis on the basis on 
fuzzy-FTA. Jafarian and Rezvani [11] also used fuzzy based FTA to examine train derailments and to 
acquire an exact estimation of event occurrence rates and its distribution function along with 
significant causes. Lin et al. [12] proposed probabilistic risk assessment methodology based on FTA 
for analysing adjacent track accidents risk. More specifically, this proposal has a structure, identifying 
scenarios for adjacent track accidents to fulfil a quantitative probability analysis derived from Boolean 
algebra on the basis of the results of the fault tree analysis.    
 
On the other hand, the investigation of natural hazard has been getting popular within the industry 
over the last few years.  Saadin eat al. [13] investigated to what degree a HSR line between Singapore 
and Malesia, on-going project, will be affected during operation by severe weather conditions such as 
rainfall, lightning, wind and very high temperatures. Dindar et al. [14] examined the diversity of 
railway turnout related derailment risk arising from natural hazards and build relations between 
derailment accidents and environmental conditions. Baker et al. [15] studied the effects of high 
summer temperatures due to climate change on buckling. As for managing risk, only two management 
frameworks aimed to reduce risk of natural hazard at RTSs have been proposed [16] [17].  Along with 
proposed management techniques, risk analysis methods were discussed to identify what the 
techniques such as FTA, event tree, Bayesian risk analysis, are suitable to what parts of RTSs [18] 
[19]. This study has suggested FTA to manage risk induced by environmental conditions for turnouts.  
 
Thus, this research establishes a risk analysis based on FTA for investigating the impact of nature 
on RTSs. The establishment is built on investigation of accident cases along with aforementioned 
researches; ref. 12, 14 and 18, and thus, the gap of this related research area is filled.   
3.  Fault Tree Analysis in Railway Researches     
 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive technique which enables the building of causal relations resulting in a 
given undesired event. This analysis approach begins with a defined system failure event and reveals 
backward its causes, down to the primary independent faults, concentrating on a single system failure 
mode [20].  
  
To complete the construction of a fault tree, it is firstly necessary to use a system flow diagram for 
an understanding of how the system functions. The diagram depicts the pathways by which goals are 
transmitted through components of the system. The steps in fault tree construction are as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
I. The selection of the system failure event of interest, known as the top event. The following 
event or events is/are considered with regard to its/ their effect on the top event.  
II. Identification of contributing events, which might directly cause the top event to occur. As 
such, four possibilities exist: 
a. primary failure of the device (e.g. aging, fatigue) 
b. secondary failure of the device (e.g. earthquake) 
c. no input to the device 
d. human error in actuating or installing the device 
 
If one of these events alone is enough to contribute to the system fault, they are linked to the top 
event through ‘an OR function`. If all of the events are required for system fault, they are related to the 
top event through ‘an AND function’ [21]. These functions are illustrated in figure 1, modified from 
[22].  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The structure of FTA 
  
Basic events (BEs), one of the common symbols used in FTA in figure 1, are the lowest level 
events within a branch. BEs bring about the occurrence of the top event in FTA. Intermediate events 
(IEs) help to describe events located between BEs and the events. Conditioning events (CAs) are a 
restriction on a logic gate in the diagram 
4.  Environmental Failures Mechanisms in RTSs 
 
GATE 1 
Train 
Derailment 
SPAD (signal 
passed at danger) 
GATE 2 
Conditions for 
derailment 
Train approaching 
red signal Failures 
EVENT 1 GATE 3 
Turnout/points not 
set 
Speed and 
alignment 
EVENT 7 
GATE 6 
AND Gate: The output event occurs 
if all input events occur 
OR Gate: The output event occurs if 
one of the input events occurs 
Basic event: A triggering event like 
component failure, human error 
 
Intermediate events: Description of 
events (e.g.) High speed train 
GATE 4 
Lack of 
maintenance 
GATE 5 
 
Conditioning event: Specific 
conditions or restrictions to any 
logic gate 
 
INHIBIT Gate: The output event 
occurs if the (single) input event 
occurs in the presence of an 
enabling 
  
 
 
 
 
Extreme environmental conditions such as high temperature, floods, and storm tides are known to be 
responsible for many derailments at RTSs [23]. Thus, it is necessary to take measurements against the 
associated potential effects of extreme weather.   
 
Table 1 Environmental-based Failure Mechanism Resulting in Derailment on Turnouts [24] 
Failure type Environmental reason Features 
Buildup of ice or 
snow 
Snow precipitation Filling the gap between 
stock rail and switch blade  
Progressive shear 
failure 
High water content Squeezing near subgrade 
surface 
Depression under ties  
Changes in 
Aerodynamics 
High wind or Tornado Blowing railway trains off 
turnouts 
Excessive plastic 
deformation 
Repeated freezing and 
thawing 
Ballast pocket 
Electricity failures Flood/Heavy rain Unusable of switch motor  
Attrition with mud 
pumping 
High water contact at 
subgrade surface 
Poor drainage 
Muddy ballast 
Inadequate sub-ballast 
Frost action Low temperature/ Frost 
susceptible soil 
Often occurs winter/spring 
season 
Buckling High temperature Turnout geometry 
problems 
Swelling/Shrinkage Changing moisture 
content 
Rough track surface 
Brittle components  Extreme cold 
temperature 
Component failures 
Separated or broken 
components 
Washout A heavy downpour of 
rain 
Turnout geometry 
problems 
Aerodynamic Forces 
 
Slides 
High wind 
Subsurface water 
Existence of mud  
Poor designed trackbed 
Soil washed or blown 
away 
Muddy track 
 
 
Table 1 is prepared by considering accident reports of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
and shows common reported failure types associated with their environmental reasons and features. 
For instance, when high water content exists in trackbed layers for some reason, it is highly likely that 
this contributes to irregularities in track geometry, resulting in progressive shear failure, attrition, 
washout etc. On the other hand, extreme low temperature might cause brittle tracks and broken or 
separated rail at RTSs, as illustrated in table 1.  
5.  FTA Structure and Discussion   
5.1.   Assignment of Gates in the FTA for RTSs 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The consideration of changes in temperature in railway industry is vital to ensure a smooth railway 
operation. The changes contribute to temperature-induced influences on the derailment as buckling, 
thermal expansion of track, uneven thermal expansion or contraction, brittle. Thus, it might be said 
that there are two temperature based variants, namely high temperature (Th) and low temperature (Tl). 
However, excessive plastic deformation resulted primarily from fluctuation in temperatures that causes 
repeated freezing and thawing in trackbed. Thus, fluctuation in temperatures is symbolised as (Tf) 
 
Precipitation might fall in either solid or liquid phases, or transition. As the number of turnout 
related derailments by environmental based reasons is quite low and data is scarce, the authors decided 
only consider two variants which makes FTA as calculatable as possible. Therefore, these two forms 
can be called and abbreviated as solid precipitation (SP), liquid precipitation (LP). SP and LP are one 
of the most common cause of derailments at RTSs, resulting in many events associated with flooding, 
runoff and antecedent rains which lead to soft and saturated trackbed, or create washouts undermining 
RTSs, or cause accumulations of snow and ice. In addition to SP and LP, the high amount of 
precipitation in a short time might result in flood causing electricity faults. Therefore, flood is denoted 
as F.  
 
Accidents associated with high winds have also been reported commonly. If they reach 
aerodynamically enough speed, rolling stocks at RTSs can be blown off tracks and cause derailment.   
 
5.2.  Scenarios and structure of the FTA for RTSs 
 
The environmental based faults on RTSs is discussed in Section 4, and variants of environmental 
impacts is discussed in Section 5.1. To implement the FTA and its corresponding probability model 
for RTSs, those sections are considered, which allows to estimate the derailment rate for a specific 
turnout. However, it is should not be forgotten that the rates are likely to be quiet low as the number of 
derailment is not high. The structure of FTA is shown in figure 2. The suggested FTA consists of 5 
IEs, 6 different CEs, 12 BEs and a top event that is environmental cause related derailment at RTSs. 
CEs are assigned to some events.  For instance, excessive plastic deformation (T4), responsible for 
turnout trackbed fault, can occurs given that repeated freezing and thawing in trackbed (Tf) exist. 
Therefore, the basic event, excessive plastic deformation, is related to Tf in the FTA. On the other 
hand, washout (T3), which is the sudden erosion of trackbed underlying a turnout, only occurs when a 
gush of water exists. Therefore, it is no need to tie it with a condition.  
 
Assuming that all basic events in the FTA are mutually independent each other, each probability 
has to correspond to the cumulative probability of lower level events. A basic event with a 
conditioning event or more is calculated as follow (Distributive Law);  
 
  
𝑋 ∩ (𝑌 ∪  𝑍)  =  (𝑋 ∩ 𝑌)  ∪ (𝑋 ∩ 𝑍)  =  𝑋 ⋅  (𝑌 + 𝑍)  =  𝑋 ⋅ 𝑌 + 𝑋 ⋅ 𝑍 (1) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The structure of FTA aiming to environmental causes of derailments at  RTSs
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Thus, probability of derailment can be calculated as follow: 
 
 
𝐷𝑇 = 𝐺 + 𝑇 + 𝑂 + 𝐶 + 𝐸 + 𝐴 
 
 
  
𝐷𝑇 = (𝐺1 + 𝑇𝐿𝑠𝐺2) + ((𝐴𝑚𝑑 + 𝑆𝑃𝑚𝑝)𝑇1 + (𝐿𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑓 + 𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑓)𝑇2 + 𝑇3 + 𝑇𝐹  𝑇4 + 𝑇𝐿𝑓 𝑇5 ) + (𝑀𝐹𝑠𝑏𝑂1
+ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 + 𝐿𝑆𝑖)𝑂2) +   𝑇𝐿𝑏𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐸1 + 𝐴 
 
 
Therefore, the probability of  𝐷𝑇 is found out in Boolean algebra as 
 
 
𝐷𝑇 = 𝐺1 + 𝑇𝐿𝑠𝐺2 + 𝑇1𝐴𝑚𝑑 + 𝑇1𝑆𝑃𝑚𝑝 + 𝑇2𝐿𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑓 + 𝑇2𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑓 + 𝑇3 + 𝑇𝐹  𝑇4 + 𝑇𝐿𝑓 𝑇5  + 𝑀𝐹𝑠𝑏𝑂1
+  𝑂2𝑇𝐿𝑖 + 𝑂2𝐿𝑆𝑖 +  𝑇𝐿𝑏𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐸1 + 𝐴 
 
 
 
where the variables are as defined in Figure 2. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This study investigates environmental causes of derailments at RTSs. In order to do this, various 
elements and variables that contribute to the occurrence of faults and failures and thereby the top 
event, derailment, explored and determined systematically. The FTA is developed by using Boolean 
algebra, which allows for calculation of branches of the tree, and revealing the logical relationship 
between contributing elements in the FTA. On the other hand, impacts of all risk elements created 
only by the nature on derailment risk at RTSs are discussed. This is the first work contributing to 
many future studies in this fields, and enables them to involve quantitative derivation of probabilities.  
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The authors are sincerely grateful to European Commission for the financial sponsorship of the 
H2020-MSCA-RISE Project No. 691135 “RISEN: Rail Infrastructure Systems Engineering Network,” 
which enables a global research network that tackles the grand challenge in railway infrastructure 
resilience and advanced sensing under extreme environments (http://www.risen2rail.eu). 
 
References 
[1] E. U. A. f. Railways, “Railway Safety Performance in the European Union,” EU, Belgium, 
2016. 
[2] UNEW, “Development of the Future Rail Freight System to Reduce the Occurrences and 
Impact of Derailment: D-RAIL SCP1-GA-2011-285162,” the European Commission, 2012. 
[3] Halcrow Group Limited, “Independent Reporter A Reporter Mandate – Coal Dust Spillage 
Costs Final Report,” HGL, London, UK, 2008. 
[4] “Rail Safety Statistics 2014-15 Annual Statistical Release,” ORR, London, 2015. 
  
 
 
 
 
[5] S. Dindar and S. Kaewunruen, “Assessment of Turnout-Related Derailments by Various 
Causes,” Sustainable Civil Infrastructures, 2017.  
[6] A. Shital and H. J. Lambert, “Decision Analysis and Risk Models for Land Development 
Affecting Infrastructure Systems.,” Risk Analysis, vol. 32, no. 7, p. 1253–1269, 2012.  
[7] L. Pei , L. Yang, Z. Gao, S. Li and Y. Gao, “Fault tree analysis combined with quantitative 
analysis for high-speed railway accidents,” Safety Science, vol. 79, p. 344–357, 2015.  
[8] Y. F. Li, J. MI , H. Z. Huang, S. P. Zhu and N. Xiao, “Fault tree analysis of train rear-end 
collision accident considering common cause failure,” Maintenance and Reliability, vol. 15, 
no. 4, p. 403–408, 2013.  
[9] N. Leveson, “A new accident model for engineering safer systems,” Safety Science, vol. 42, pp. 
237-270, 2014.  
[10] C. Yao, Improving railway safety risk assessment study, Birmingham: PhD Thesis: Birmingham 
Centre for Railway Research and Education, Birmingham University, 2013.  
[11] E. Jafarian and M. A. Rezvani, “Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: 
Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit,” Application of fuzzy fault tree analysis for evaluation of 
railway safety risks: an evaluation of root causes for passenger train derailment, vol. 226, no. 
1, pp. 14-25, 2012.  
[12] C. Y. Lin, M. R. Saat and P. L. Christopher , “Fault Tree Analysis of Adjacent Track Accidents 
on Shared-Use Rail Corridors,” Transportation Research Record: Journal of the 
Transportation Research Board, vol. 2546, 2016.  
[13] L. S. Binti Saadin, S. Kaewunruen and J. David, “Risks of Climate Change with respect to the 
Singapore-Malaysia High Speed Rail System,” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, vol. 169, no. 5, pp. 308-320, 2016.  
[14] S. Dindar, K. Sakdirat, M. An and M. H. Osman, “Natural hazard risks on railway turnout 
systems,” Procedia Engineering, vol. 161, p. 1254–1259, 2016. 
[15] K. Dobney, C. J. Baker, A. D. Quinn and L. Chapman, “Quantifying the effects of high summer 
temperatures due to climate change on buckling and rail related delays in south‐ east United 
Kingdom,” Meteorological Applications, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 245-251, Meteorological 
Applications.  
[16] S. Dindar and K. Sakdirat , “Investigation of Risk-based Maintenance Strategies for Turnout 
Geometry Restoration” in The 1st Asian Conference on Railway Infrastructure and 
Transportation, Jeju, Korea, 2016.  
[17] M. F. Ishak, S. Dindar and S. Kaewunruen, “Safety-based Maintenance for Geometry 
Restoration of Railway Turnout Systems in Various Operational Environments,” in 
Proceedings of The 21st National Convention on Civil Engineering, Songkhla, THAILAND, 
2016.  
[18] S. Dindar, . S. Kaewunruen and M. An, “Identification of appropriate risk analysis techniques 
for railway turnout systems,” Journal Of Risk Research, pp. 1-21, E-pub ahead of print, 
2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1264452. 
[19]  Dindar S., Kaewunruen S. (2018) Assessment of Turnout-Related Derailments by Various 
Causes. In: Pombo J., Jing G. (eds) Recent Developments in Railway Track and 
Transportation Engineering. GeoMEast 2017. Sustainable Civil Infrastructures. Springer, 
Cham, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61627-8_2. 
[20] M. Sadiq, M. Rahmani, M. Ahmad and S. Jung, “Software risk assessment and evaluation 
process (SRAEP) using model based approach,” in 2010 International Conference on 
Networking and Information Technology (ICNIT), IEEE, 2010, 2010.  
[21] N. H. Roberts and W. E. Vesely, Fault Tree Handbook, Washinghton: System and Reability 
  
 
 
 
 
Research, US Government Printing Office, 1987.  
[22] Q. Mahboob, M. Kunze, J. Trinckauf and U. Maschek, “A Flexible and Concise Framework for 
Hazard Quantification: An Example from Railway Signalling System,” in Proceedings of the 
QR2MSE, IEEE Xplore, Chengdu , 2012.  
[23] S. Dindar, S. Kaewunruen, M. An and M. H. Osman, “Natural hazard risks on railway turnout 
systems,” Natural hazard risks on railway turnout systems', vol. 161, p. 1254–1259, 2016,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2016.08.561. 
[24] S. Dindar, S. Kaewunruen and J. M. Sussman, “Climate Change Adaptation for Derailment-
Based Georisk Mitigation Of Railway Turnout Systems,” in Transportation Geotechnics and 
Geoecology, TGG 2017, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2017.05.032. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
